President Uribe infected with swine flu

Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe has contracted swine flu during the UNASUR summit of Latin American leaders, a Colombian minister, said. He began showing symptoms of the A(H1N1) virus on Friday, upon returning from the meeting in Bariloche, Argentina. Foreign media have not reported the case, so far.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) summit convened in Argentina on Friday to discuss a deal, which would give US troops access to seven military bases across Colombia.

Colombia has confirmed 621 cases of swine flu, 34 of which have been fatal. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), at least 209,438 lab-confirmed swine flu cases have been reported worldwide.

Indigenous flee after massacre

300 family members of the 12 indigenous Awa massacred last week continue to be harassed and threatened despite moving out of the area, according to the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC). The Awa of this area are currently existing in "critical humanitarian conditions," according to ONIC. The organisation also demands that the government deal with the state of emergency and exile that these communities are facing, and to provide protection to witnesses of the massacre.

Indigenous Awa massacre

12 members of the Awa indigenous tribe have been massacred by armed men in an indian reservation in Nariño, southwest Colombia. 4 of them were children. This is the third attack against indigenous Awa in Colombia in 2009. About 1,500 members of the Awa live on the reservation. Of the 77 indigenous killed this year, 38 were Awa.

Although the Colombian government were quick in accusing the Farc rebels, these attacks come after death threats were made against the Awa Indigenous Organization by members of the Army and the paramilitaries.

Indigenous people in Colombia often find themselves on the front line, with guerrillas, government forces and paramilitaries contesting control over areas with coca plantations or rich in natural resources.

"Two Colombias"

Some 380,000 Colombians were forced from their homes last year by the continuing armed conflict, a local human rights group has said. The Centre for Human Rights and the Displaced, Codhes, says this is a 25% rise on 2008 and brings the total displaced since 1985 to 4.6 million. Government officials say the number registered as displaced has risen. But they say the Codhes total includes figures from previous years and those falsely claiming compensation. In its annual report, Codhes says 2008 saw the rate of displacement rising to levels last seen in 2002, the worst year on record when 410,000 people were forced to flee.

According to its study, 380,863 people had to leave their homes or places of work as a result of the armed conflict between guerrillas, paramilitary groups and the security forces. Codhes says that between 1985 and 2008, 4.6 million Colombians have been uprooted. "The great majority live in severe conditions of poverty," the Codhes report said, while their own land and property had fallen into the hands of others in a "de facto expropriation".

According to government figures, 2.9 million people were displaced between 1997 and 2008. The government department dedicated to helping such people, Accion Social, said the number seeking to be registered as displaced and therefore qualifying for aid had risen, but often these were for events dating back to the 1980s, 1970s and even 1961. Accion Social said around a third of the people included in the Codhes figure had in fact been displaced in 2007.

Fraudsters, officials said, had also mounted schemes to register thousands of people as displaced thereby "robbing those really displaced by violence in Colombia of the chance to get help". Whatever the actual figures, it is clear that two Colombias are developing under President Alvaro Uribe. Towns and cities, where the majority of Colombians live, have become safer under his administration, with murders and kidnappings down. But in rural areas, where most of the displacement takes place, the situation is as bad, or perhaps worse, than ever...

Israel of Latin America ?

President Chavez freezes ties with Colombia, withdrawing its ambassador from Bogotá and halting trade deals. Venezuela, he said, would also substitute imports from Colombia - which currently account for about a third of the country's trade - with goods from other countries, notably Brazil and Ecuador. The announcement came a day after the Colombia government said weapons bought by Venezuela from Sweden in the 1980s had ended up with Colombian guerrillas. The Colombian government said its troops had recovered Swedish anti-tank weapons in a raid on a camp run by the Farc. Mr Chavez, denying that Venezuela armed "any guerrilla group or armed group", accused Mr Uribe of behaving irresponsibly with his "unfounded" accusations.

But there is something else -

The dispute between the two neighbours comes as Colombia prepares to allow the US to use four of its military bases, a move which has angered Venezuela. Colombia says the accord will give the US military access to air bases to gather intelligence and support operations against drugs production and terrorism. But Mr Chavez says it is part of an effort by Washington to turn Colombia into the "Israel of Latin America".

....cirque du soleil?

..Uribe agrees US "access"

The Colombian government of Álvaro Uribe confirmed that it would give the United States access to at least three military bases "to increase Colombia's overall military and paramilitary engagement in the Colombian conflict". "The plan is to strengthen Colombian military bases, not to open American bases in Colombia," he said.

Meanwhile, Venezuela has threatened to review its relations with neighboring Colombia over the country's plan to allow US troops to use its military bases. Reports say that the United States could have access to three to four bases in Colombia for anti-narcotics surveillance flights. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez says the plan is "a threat against us.” "They are surrounding Venezuela with military bases," he said in a televised speech. The move "obliges us to review our relations" with Colombia, Chavez said. Other countries in the region, like Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, have also criticized the plan.

The U.S.-financed multi-billion-dollar Plan Colombia, initially presented as an anti-drug strategy but later described also as a counterinsurgency plan against the FARC has been operating since January 2000. The U.S. classifies the FARC as a terrorist and drug trafficking organisation. The Colombian government is trying to get the U.S. to limit its funding cuts for Plan Colombia, which has enabled it to fight the rebels from the air and to expand the deployment of land troops.

Colombia is the third-largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world, after Israel and Egypt.

US weighs costs of Plan Colombia...

According to official figures, since 2000 the US has spent about $6bn (£3.8bn) fighting drug production in Colombia and training its army to battle rebel groups. The centrepiece of Plan Colombia has been the aerial spraying of coca plants, which yield the raw material for cocaine - which then helps finance the rebels. Colombia is the world's top cocaine producer. Yet the US plan has proved highly controversial. Policymakers argue it is in the national interest to fight cocaine at its source and to stabilise Colombia. Critics agree - but say the current plan is ineffective, targets desperate farmers and has worsened an existing humanitarian crisis.

Under the plan, the US has given Alvaro Uribe's government more than $600m each year, heavily slanted towards military aid. It has supplied helicopters, advisers, trainers and intelligence to the Colombian army to help it modernise and operate more effectively against both the coca farmers and rebels. Congress initially specified that the aid should only be used against drug lords but US had previously indicated that some of it should be spent on counter-terrorism efforts. The Colombian armed forces had regained control of many areas formerly held by rebels and made inroads into their financing.

The number of fighters in rebel group Farc might have fallen but the goal of reducing the cultivation and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50% in six years had not been met. Opium poppy cultivation and heroin production have fallen by half. But coca cultivation and cocaine production levels is on the increase. It is said farmers had found ways to defy aerial and manual eradication programmes, by planting smaller patches or moving to new ground.

The end of violence?

The Defence Minister of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, recently stepped down in order to prepare a bid for the presidency in next years’ election. Santos has been lavished with praise for his term in charge of the Armed Forces and is credited, among other things, with successfully carrying out the government’s Democratic Security Policy – effectively giving a mortal blow to the FARC. At the heart of this policy is an attempt to defeat illegal armed groups and (re)-establish state authority. This involves demobilising right-wing paramilitaries and intensifying military incursions against the guerrillas. The end goal? To stabilise the territories under their control and consolidate the state’s presence in these areas.

The perceived success of these actions has led to an official discourse among government officials that the conflict in Colombia is now ‘over’ and that the country is moving into its post-conflict phase. Any reports of violence are dismissed as mere drug related criminality and terrorist behaviour. Such discourse raises questions about the return of the country’s 2 to 4 million (depending on whose is counting) internally displaced people (IDPs). If Colombia is in fact transitioning into a post-conflict phase, we can legitimately start asking whether the displaced are going to be able to return to the lands and homes that were illegally appropriated during the conflict. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. At a recent workshop on the prospects for peace without a negotiated solution to the displacement issue, several experts highlighted some of the shortcomings in the government’s discourse of peace, justice and return.
First of all, many victims - including many of the displaced, especially women, and those that have been victims of state crimes - have been excluded from reparation processes. In fact, the UN has recently called on Congress not to discriminate between victims of state violence and irregular forces. This selectivity seems to indicate that the reparation process, which includes access to people’s lands, is seen by the government as being about solidarity rather than about rights.

A second area of concern is the way in which the government has facilitated some returns. Several returnees have effectively been asked to support the government’s counter-insurgency strategy by acting as a network of informants on the presence and activities of guerrilla forces and sympathisers. This undermines their civilian status and puts them in danger of retaliation from the guerrillas. The recent massacre of the indigenous Awa people is testimony to these dangers.

The economic component of the government’s democratic security policy is a third obstacle to return. The recovery of territory from illegal armed groups is seen as a means to open up new areas for economic development, mainly in the extractive and agro-export sector. These are key areas for exploitation in the government’s development vision for 2019. So, in territories that have been successfully recovered by the government, property rights have often been given to large companies at the expense of those displaced. The peasantry that worked those lands for many years without legal tenure have also had to leave, often not for the first time. This tension between the government’s development model and the restoration of rights to IDPs is a major obstacle for sustainable return.

Perhaps most alarmingly though, is the fact that displacement figures during Alvaro Uribe’s second term have actually gone up significantly after an initial decline. Government figures show that forced displacement increased 19% in 2004, 5% in 2005, 6% in 2006 and 6.3% in 2007. That is a 36% increase from 2004 bringing the estimated total of IDPs registered in the government system to well over 2.5 million. These numbers clearly question the discourse of post-conflict recovery or peace. The failure to recognise these realities on the ground has undermined attempts at tackling the causes of conflict and displacement, which in turn has condemned many of the displaced to a cheap and arbitrary ‘peace’.

by Samir Elhawary extract from Online Exchange, ODI-HPN, 22/06/09

Drawing the Colombian conflict

GOC = Government of Colombia
ARMY = National Army
AUC = Auto Defensa Colombiana (paramilitaries)
FARC = Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombia (guerrilla)
ELN = Ejército de Liberación Nacional (guerrilla)

P = People (civilians)

*AUC have officially demobilised between 2003 and 2006.
For the Govt of Colombia there are no longer paramilitaries involved in the conflict (However, I add, they are back and regrouping)

-----------------------------------------------------------

I know what you´re thinking now. Yes, it's complicated.

Colombia's protracted conflict has many battlefronts across most regions. Beside confrontations among armed actors, the VIOLENCE is characterised by attacks and threats against civilians. Threats are used to indimidate and maintain the domination of illegal groups over the land and force farmers to develop illicit crops such as coca.

Under the current administration, with the financial help of US, anti-insurgency and anti narcotics campaigns have weakened FARC and ELN. However, they have resulted in breaches of internation humanitarian and human rights law by all parties and the offensive has led to massive displacements of the rural poulation.
Re-grouping of paramilitaries and other illegal groups, attacks and blockades by the guerrilla, army presence as counterinsurgency, forced confinements, forced recruitment, victims of landmines, land confiscation, air fumigations to erradicate coca fields that instead damage food crops are ONLY some of the problems.

1. The offensive by the GOC and the Army to regain the 'lost land' is aggravating the humanitarian problem.

2. Military offensive = more violence = more people displaced = more landmines = more civilian victims

3. To regain the land is a lot more to do with economic interests, exploit rich natural resources with multinational taking over farmers and indigenous land with their own 'development projects'.

4. In the drug chain is normally farmers who cultivate coca, the guerilla collects and process it, and it is sold to other illegal groups or paramilitaries or directly to the drug lords who look after the distribution.

IT MUST BE CLEAR THEY ARE ALL FIGHTING FOR THE CONTROL OF TERRITORY, FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND FOR ILLICIT BUSINESS.

False Positives and Para-politics

So, Colombia has been in the grip of a civil war since 1964, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas rose up in arms.

In response: The paramilitary groups or Auto-Defensas Colombiana (AUC) in their present form, emerged in the 1980s to combat the leftist insurgents with the help of politicians and the armed forces. A political scandal (parapolitics) that has recently engulfed Colombia's political class came a step closer to the president, Alvaro Uribe, after his cousin and close political companion was arrested on charges of colluding with rightwing paramilitary groups. Mario Uribe was the latest in a string of more than 30 politicians elected to Congress in 2006 who have been arrested on charges related to conspiracy with the paramilitary death squads that controlled huge swathes of the nation before they began demobilising in 2003. Yet, the Colombian population it’s adamantly pro-Uribe. Since taking office in 2002, Uribe has promised to crackdown on the country’s left-wing guerrilla and the disarmament program for its right-wing paramilitaries.

However, new illegal armed groups have emerged and resumed combats. By all accounts, demobilized paramilitaries are a major part of the illegal armed groups. Post-2003 demobilization and reintegration policies have not prevented former paramilitaries from killing and engaging in other criminal acts. Although senior paramilitary leaders have been arrested, the economic and command and control structures of paramilitaries do not appear to have been fully and effectively dismantled. In addition, there is an alarming level of impunity for former paramilitaries, and the investigation and prosecution of extrajudicial executions and other human rights violations by former paramilitaries appears to lag severely.

Last week the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions Philip Alston visited Colombia. On the last day of his visit, Alston partially reported his findings during a press conference in which he spoke about extrajudicial excecutions made by the Army, paramilitary and guerrilla groups. According to his declarations, these excecutions are close to being systematic. The most prominent concern is the incidence of so-called falsos positivos.

The phenomenon is well known. The victim is lured under false pretenses by a “recruiter” to a remote location. There, the individual is killed soon after arrival by members of the military. The scene is then manipulated to make it appear as if the individual was legitimately killed in combat. The victim is commonly photographed wearing a guerrilla uniform, and holding a gun or grenade. Victims are often buried anonymously in communal graves, and the killers are rewarded for the results they have achieved in the fight against the guerillas.

Alston brought up the issue of intimidation and threats made upon human rights defenders and the accusations they receive by high level officials of sympathizing with rebel groups. He called for the seize of the stigmatization of these groups. According to Alston, the law on victims rights needs to be reformed in order for it to include victims of both state and non-state actors.

Who was responsible for these premeditated killings? Alston asserts there is no evidence to suggest that these killings were carried out as a matter of official Government policy, or that they were directed by, or carried out with the knowledge of, the President or successive Defense Ministers. Neverthless, the full report will be published in 4 or 5 months and presented to the UN.

p.s. Let´s see and wait

FARC and ELN - Colombia's Left Wing Guerrillas

I found this article an excellent piece to get to know the context of the guerrillas in Colombia.

From Stephanie Hanson, News Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, March 11, 2008

FARC and ELN were both founded in the 1960s, after Colombia’s two main political parties ended more than a decade of political violence and agreed to share power. In 1963, students, Catholic radicals, and left-wing intellectuals hoping to emulate Fidel Castro’s communist revolution in Cuba founded ELN. FARC formed in 1965, bringing together communist militants and peasant self-defense groups.

Although ELN is more ideological than FARC, the two groups have similar programs: Both say they represent the rural poor against Colombia’s wealthy classes and oppose U.S. influence in Colombia, the privatization of natural resources, multinational corporations, and rightist violence. In 2006, the ELN decided to shift its political strategy to urban areas. There are indications it would like official political recognition, but it has not stated clearly what such recognition would entail.

The two groups have an ambiguous relationship; in some parts of the country they cooperate, while in others they have clashed directly. FARC is Colombia’s largest and best-equipped rebel group. According to the Colombian government, the group had roughly sixteen-thousand members in 2001. It operates in roughly one-third of the country, mostly in the jungles of the south and east. In 1999, during peace negotiations with the group, then-president Andres Pastrana ceded control of a 42,000-square-mile area (roughly the size of Switzerland) to the FARC. After three years of fruitless negotiations and a series of high-profile terrorist acts, Pastrana ended peace talks in February 2002 and ordered Colombian forces to start retaking the FARC-controlled zone. When Alvaro Uribe took office in 2002, he launched an aggressive security campaign against the FARC and ELN, bolstered by U.S. funding from "Plan Colombia", a multibillion dollar counternarcotics aid package. In 2007, members of the FARC’s leadership were killed and several of the group’s hostages were murdered under murky circumstances. In 2008, the chief spokesman in the FARC’s secretariat, Raul Reyes, was killed during a Colombian incursion into Ecuador. “These episodes show an insurgent group in a state of strategic crisis,” writes Adam Isacson on his blog for the Center for International Policy. He adds that the FARC can no longer depend on local populations for support, as many have turned against the group due to its violent methods. The smaller ELN , which operates mainly in northeastern Colombia, is estimated to have between 2,200 and 3,000 members, which marks a significant reduction in military capability since the late 1990s. Advances by AUC paramilitaries, competition with the FARC, and more aggressive government security forces all contribute to the ELN ’s weakening. Several ELN units are trained for special operations, however, and are skilled in explosive weapons manufacturing. The FARC and ELN cooperate in some parts of the country, but armed clashes have occurred between the two groups in other areas.

Funding

Experts estimate that FARC takes in $200 million to $300 million annually—at least half of its income—from the illegal drug trade. The FARC also profits from kidnappings, extortion schemes, and an unofficial “tax” it levies in the countryside for “protection” and social services. About sixty-five of the FARC’s 110 operational units are involved in some aspect of the drug trade, according to a 2005 International Crisis Group report, but evidence from that period indicates they primarily managed local production. The U.S. government alleges the FARC’s role in the drug trade is more significant. According to a 2006 U.S. Department of Justice indictment, the FARC supplies more than 50 percent of the world’s cocaine. The U.S. Treasury Department has frozen the assets of several individuals it asserts are significant foreign narcotics traffickers within the FARC. However, other evidence suggests the FARC’s involvement with the drug trade remains local. According to the 2007 UN World Drug report, the bulk of drug trafficking in Colombia is controlled by professional drug smuggling groups, while the FARC is focused on the cultivation and processing of coca (PDF). The ELN ’s primary income source is also drug trafficking, a shift from the ransom or “protection” payments that accounted for much of its funding in the 1980s, and the kidnappings that produced revenue in the 1990s. Colombian government sources believe this latest shift occurred between 2005 and 2007, which coincides with increased ELN activity on the Pacific coast and Venezuelan border, coca-growing regions, and drug-trafficking zones.

Terrorist Acts

The FARC is responsible for most of the ransom kidnappings in Colombia; the group targets wealthy landowners, foreign tourists, and prominent international and domestic officials. Notable FARC operations include: the November 2005 kidnapping of sixty people, many of whom are being held hostage by the FARC until the government decides to release hundreds of their comrades serving prison sentences; the February 2002 hijacking of a domestic commercial flight and the kidnapping of a Colombian senator on board; the February 2002 kidnapping of a Colombian presidential candidate, Ingrid Betancourt, who was traveling in guerrilla territory. Betancourt is the most prominent member of a group of hostages held by the FARC; the October 2001 kidnapping and assassination of a former Colombian minister of culture; the March 1999 murder of three U.S. missionaries working in Colombia, which resulted in a U.S. indictment of the FARC and six of its members in April 2002.The ELN, which is also known for kidnapping wealthy Colombians for ransom, uses bombing campaigns and extortion against multinational and domestic oil companies. ELN attacks on oil pipelines have killed civilians and drawn the attention of the Bush administration, which has suggested training the Colombian armed forces to protect oil facilities. There is evidence the FARC and the ELN are also involved in kidnappings across the border in Venezuela (WashPost). According to the Venezuelan government, 382 people were taken hostage in 2007, up from 232 the previous year.

Ties to Other Governments

When President Uribe launched his crackdown on the two guerrilla groups in 2003, both sought refuge in the areas bordering Ecuador and Venezuela. These border regions are hotbeds of illegal activity such as drug trafficking and arms dealings. Both rebel groups frequently cross into neighboring territory to avoid Colombian military sweeps. Following the death of Raul Reyes in March 2008, the Colombian government claimed to have found documents on a rebel laptop that indicated Venezuela and Ecuador were providing material support to the FARC. According to these documents, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez gave the group $300 million (AP). The Venezuelan government denies the allegations, and says the funds were to negotiate the release of hostages held by the group.Since mid-2007, Chavez has been acting as an unofficial negotiator between the Colombian government and the FARC. He engineered the release of several hostages, but Uribe does not accept him as an official negotiator. Experts say the hostage release process could be seriously damaged by the death of Reyes, who was an interlocutor in the negotiations.

Prospects for Peace

The FARC has been involved in peace talks with the Colombian government since the 1980s. Some experts suggest the rebels continues to enter talks because it legitimizes their social justice cause. In October 2006, the FARC issued a letter that clarified the conditions under which they would agree to a bilateral cease-fire and prisoner exchange. Since then, there has been some forward movement on the exchange of imprisoned FARC members for hostages, but no negotiations on a cease-fire or demobilization. The Center for International Policy summarizes the uneven progress of peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC. The Colombian government has been engaged in a peace process with the ELN since May 2004, but as of October 2007, eight rounds of talks had yet to produce any results. The two parties disagree on the terms of a cease-fire, whether the ELN should end kidnappings, and the ELN’s use of anti-personnel mines. Because of the ELN’s weakened military position, some Colombians believe the group is no longer a threat. But an October 2007 International Crisis Group briefing cautions that the group “has shown a capacity to survive and revive after coming close to demise.”

p.s. talking about socialism...

So, what's this blog all about?

I am not a 'natural born blogger' and NEITHER believed on the possibility to find spare time to write one. Yet, some people insisted I should try out. So, be it, then.

In brief, I am going to explain the idea behind it.

Colombia is one of the largest and most complicated humanitarian emergencies around the world - with little or no international media coverage whatsover - It's a truly forgotten crisis -

Since Colombia seems to be getting in the news only for coca trafficking, the idea would be to give some kind of visibility and to try generate an interest among the public or whoever wants to follow this blog. Also, I intend to give some ideas about life in urban Colombia and get rid of that stereotype...

Unfortunately, in some parts of Colombia, mainly in rural areas, the situation is very serious indeed and its getting worse every day. The conflict is deeply engulfed in a situation that has so far led to mass displacements, expulsions, mobility restrictions, selected homicides, landmines victims etc. What´s worse here is that even ordinary Colombians know very little about the real situation since national media also pretty much ignore what's going on.

There are many reasons why the humanitarian situation in Colombia does not get international coverage. Politics apart (there is too much to talk about, later then..) in Colombia there aren't the refugee camps or genocides of Rwanda or Darfur taking place to grab the headlines. But neither the armed conflict in Colombia grabs the headlines of the likes of Pakistan, Afghanistan or Iraq...

Nevertheless, I can tell you that the armed conflict in Colombia has had devastating effects on civilians. A large number of displaced persons, especially from ethnic minorities, have over the years moved into cities, town outskirts or crossed over national borders. Many people have been forced out or confined, many youngsters are forcibly recruited into guerrilla ranks, sexual violence, threats and selected killings are some of the other major impact on communities. Colombia has the highest number of new victims in the world. Colombia ranks second in the number of landmines concentration in the world and ranks first for victims as a result.

Colombia´s displaced people are thought to be around 4 million. All these numbers continue to rise. That's not less than Darfur...

The business of plastic surgery and pimpineros

Now, close your eyes and imagine Colombia. I bet you see remote mountains, guerrillas and narcotraffic. A dangerous place. True. In some areas. Many parts of Colombia also look like these - Modern shopping centres, trendy bars, restaurants, prestigious hotels and luxury cars - Essentially, in some parts of Colombia there is money or "plata" as they say over here. Lots of plata, in fact. Where is the money coming from, well, that's another issue. Oil, coal and narcotraffic, illegal profits that needs to be reinvested.

Here's a sample: A litre of petrol costs 30 cents (Euro) over here. In neighbouring Venezuela, you can fill your tank (60/70 litres) with 30 cents !!!!! A bottle of water costs more than filling your tank with petrol. No wonder every day there is a massive traffic jam at the border. The so-called "pimpineros", people filling up on the other side using a well established corrupted system and passwords to allow a safe return journey at the frontier. Petrol business is so huge, cars cross over 20 times a day to refill. They don't just refill their tank, they have a system where petrol is filled in the entire car, even through inner doors. A multi-million business, indeed. I leave the narcotraffic business for my next off-topic post.

Anyhow, when approaching the border with Venezuela, the edge of the street gets very crowded with people flashing banknotes for those wishing to change their money as Venezuela offer cheaper prices at the duty free area with many goods like fashion clothing, liquors and mixed products.

Beauty farms and plastic surgeries are also very common both in Colombia and Venezuela. Someone visiting these areas gets the feeling women are kind of "well-manicured". That's because virtually anyone can afford to change their nose, boobs or doing a liposuction treatment for the ridiculous price of 350 Euro.

Recommended reading: Cien años de soledad (1oo years of loneliness), Gabriel García Márquez

"Los minutos"

Like elsewhere, in Colombia you have phone boxes (see picture at the very background). Like elsewhere, phone boxes are in decline because of the extensive use of mobile phones. Unlike elsewhere, In Colombia you have a mobile phonebox. "Los Minutos" is someone sitting in the middle of the road with a few mobile phones available for those who needs to make a quick call. That's simple enough. A good idea in fact, if you do not own a mobile phone. However, it is very likely that those people using los minutos actually have their own mobile phone. And that's because it is actually cheaper than calling from your own phone, it's only 200 pesos per minute (about 7 cents of 1 Euro).

All Colombians, at least in urban areas, have a mobile phone. I have also seen people with 2. However, if you see someone on the phone while walking or shopping or working you can bet they are receiving and not calling out.

Remember, in Colombia people make calls at "los minutos". The fact that's officially illegal is another story...

Colombia's Soccer Team

Sorry, but had to begin this journey in a good mood.

A real soccer icon, Carlos Alberto Valderrama is without a doubt Colombia's most popular former footballer, who started his long career at Unión Magdalena in 1981. The midfielder led the national team at three World Cups (1990 to 1998) and represented teams as Millonarios, Deportivo Cali, Nacional de Medellín, Junior and Tampa Bay. He retired from professional football in 2002, when playing for the Colorado Rapids. Rather than his flamboyant playing style you could easily recognise his unique hairstyle...

Saturday 6th of June: Colombia play Argentina in a crucial World Cup qualifier. And all you hear about is when they beat Argentina 5-0 in their own ground and celebrations went on for days. Hoping for a memorable 'doblete'.

Where the road begins...

COLOMBIA: A SHORT INTRODUCTION

The 45-year old conflict in Colombia is extremely complex and its roots go back in history. Several political, economic and social causes continues to be the cause of a protracted humanitarian crisis that weighs heavily on civilians. Continued armed confrontations between the National Army and insurgents groups like FARC and ELN, and rearmed holdouts of paramilitary groups known as the 'new armed bands' continue to pose massive hazards to vulnerable communities, particularly indigenous people and afro-descendants. Struggles for territorial control have so far displaced about 4 millions people over the last 20 years. Colombia has the highest rate of new victims worldwide caused by the armed conflict as well as the second highest concentration of landmines in the world. Breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law are part of everyday life in some parts of Colombia. While forced recruitment of young adults and kidnapping continues, an unknown number of communities trapped by minefields and crossfire are often inaccessible, resulting in shortages of food and medicines.

The Government of Colombia is effectively the major provider of humanitarian assistance. However, the current administration do not acknowledge the existence of an internal armed conflict or humanitarian crisis. The crisis is not visible because the official discourse has deliberately opted to refer it as a ''terrorist threat' or as a ''situation of violence''. This is very significant for the purpose of attracting foreign economic investments and in creating a sense of stability. On the other hand, the humanitarian crisis is constantly overshadowed by the emergence of illegal economies such as narcotraffic that normally attracts the attention of both national and international media. The current military offensive on the ground seems to be very much part of the government political and economic agenda other than humanitarian.

Like all nation-states, it is the Colombian authorities that are eventually responsible for the protection and security of its own people. The UN and other international humanitarian organisations simply complement this process of humanitarian assistance.

This brief introduction is meant to give a general overview of the main, national context. However, it is not so black and white, especially at regional and local level.

There is more to follow, so stay tuned...

Welcome and hasta pronto